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Examining employer proposals for labour 
law reform: an American perspective 
E.J. Dannin* 
The article examines proposals advanced by enzpluyer organisations for labour law 
reform, which they claim is modelled on, among others, the American system. The 
article demonstrates that those clainzs are seriously flawed and are based on an 
incomplete and inaccurate understanding of the functioning of the Anzerican and 
other system,s. 
Since the enactment of the Labour Relations Act in 1987, the New Zealand 
Employers' Federation and the New Zealand Business Roundtable (hereafter generally 
referred to as the associations) have vtgorously advocated further changes. These include 
abolishing the award system, compulsory unionism, the blanket coverage of awards, and 
the Labour Court as well as reforming the adversarial structure of industrial law. A major 
part or their argument lS that these features of labour law arc unique to New Zealand 
(Kerr, 1989; Trotter, 1986b, pp.8-9) and that abolishing them will re~ult tn "flexible, 
decentraliscd bargaining" enhancing, "through productivity, the returns for both 
investment of labour and in'vcstmcnt capiLal" (NZEF, 1988c; Fergusson, 1989~ NZEF, 
1989a; NZEF, 1987; NZBR, 1988; sec also Btrch, 1987). 
This article examtnes these cJa.irns of untqueness, with a particular focus on industrial 
relations in the United States, a country frequently cited as a model by these associations. 
!vlost of the associations' claims arc asseruon') with no attribution or study cited. Often 
they appear to be holding up Japan and the United States as thetr models Such an 
examination leads to the inescapable conclusion that, despite their presumed abtlity to 
ascertain the truth, the associations have done a very poor job of research, for they arc 
mistaken as to the position in those countries. 
1. Voluntary versus compulsory unionism 
The number one item on the associations' agenda is the clirnination of what they refer 
to as compulsory unionism (and which is referred to in the United States as union 
security). They claim they want to eliminate compul~ory unionism (NZEF, 1989b; 
NZEF, 1988a, p.3; NZBR, 1989, p.6; Hutton, 1987, p.6), out of concern for the worker, 
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out of concern for freedom, pure and simple.l In a more candid explanation, Lindsay 
Fergusson of the Business Roundtable sees voluntary unionism as part of a programme 
"aimed at establishing a free and dccentraliscd system of contracting" that would facilitate 
" individualised forms of contracting which suit workers whose needs vary from the 
norm." In other words, he hopes that eliminating compulsory unionism would weaken 
unions. As is the case with most of the associations' proposals, he also contends that 
New Zealand and Australia are unique in maintaining compulsory unionism among all 
other OECD countries (Fergusson, 1989 , pp.6-7; NZBR, 1987, p.7; NZBR, 1986, p.47; 
Rowe, 1983, p.29). 
The Labour Relations Act, of course, docs not make unionism compulsory in the 
sense that workers arc unable to escape union membership. Workers covered by an award 
must vote for compu l<;ory membership. In the case of an agreement the statute merel y 
makes It permiSSible for empl oyers and unions to agree to incorporate compulsory 
unionism c lauses. It docs not force employers to agree to them. The law also 
accommodates those workers who do not wish to belong by providing a process for 
cxcmpllon from membership (s<;.82, and 83; sec generall y Kahn-Frcund, 1977, p.201). 
Workers thus arc gtvcn the legal abi lity to choose whether to belong to unions or not. 
The moral n ghtncss or wrongness of forced union membership, the philosophical 
questions of how best to analogisc union membership, as akin to citizenship or club 
membership is a byway that we will forgo visiting in this article. T he question here is 
not concern for the nghts of workers or economic power, or even v.- hethcr people should 
support or oppo<;c compulsory un1ontsm depending on how they feel about unions 
maintmning or increasing thctr power in relation to employers (Hanson, et a!, 1982, 
p.9). The qucslion here is w hether New Zealand stands virtually alone tn making union 
membership compuhory. 
Anyone who has practiced m the field of Industrial relations in the United States 
longer than a day wlll know that it has the same feature, although it uses the more 
benign term, union security. In a decade of prac tice in the field, I do not recall ever 
having seen a collecti ve bargaining agreement without a union secunty clause, and I am 
also aware that tht~ 1s an issue unions arc adamant about 1n bargatntng. Not only do 
unions want them as a means of eltminating the problem of the free rider , the prC\Cnce of 
a bona fide union secunty cbuse is also necessary to invok e the protec tions of the 
contract bar doctnne, prcventtng any other election being held in that unit for as much as 
3 year<;. 
~1orcovcr, a survey of other countr ies found that the} arc common to all developed 
countnes. In 1980 m Bntain, 40 percent of un10n members worked In closed shops, that 
is, est.abltshments that required union membership before employment (no fi gures were 
given for other form~ of compulsory unionism there); in 1980 in the United Sta tes, 97 
percent of collec tive bargainmg agreemen t~ had some form of union secu rity, with 74 
percen t of construcuon union contracts prov Idtng for a de facto closed shop (a form of 
union secunty wh1ch IS outlawed elsewhere in the United States); in 1977 in Canada, 60 
percent of manufacturing employees were covered by union shop provistons and another 
8.7 percent by clo~ed ~hop provt~Jons. These arrangements arc common in Japan and 
even In many European countrtcs where they are outlawed. In Belgium, Denmark, 
Netherlands, and France the funcuonal equ ivalent of compulsory uniont srn e\ISts 
(Cordova and Ozaki, 1980, pp.28-29). Another study found that in the pcn od 1958-1980, 
75 percent of the collective bargatning agreements in the United SLates had cJther union 
1 When told that an employer refused to agree to compulsory membership "on principle," 
Judge Stms responded that he did not undcrst..md what the pnnciple was, that the argument 
IS used by employers every ttmc and yet he had been unable to discover the principle 
(Walsh, 1983, pp.15 -16; cf., Brosnan, et al., 1985, p.lO) 
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shop or agency clauses and that in 1980, 85 percent had some sort of union security 
clause (Cullen, 1985, p.306). 
Furthermore, compulsory payment of union dues even by non-members is accepted 
practice in countries, such as Canada, the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland (Cordova and Ozaki, 1980, p.31).2 
Perhaps the United States is often pointed to as an example in this area, (Fergusson, 
1989, p.6) as a consequence of certain states' "right-to-work" laws, which proscribe many 
forms of compulsory unionism. They were enacted as a result of pressure from employer 
groups hoping to weaken unions in those states. Whether they have accomplished this 
goal is unclear. 
Not a lot is clearly known about their effect, separated from pre-existing conditions, 
demographic , economic, or technical changes, and the like. It is known that wages arc 
lower in those states; however, they were lower prior to the enactment of right-to-work 
laws. Some studies find that the gap between union and non-union wages is higher in 
right-to-work states. This is possibly the effect of unions not needing to trade off wages 
for union security clauses (Moore and Newman, 1985, pp. 579-80). Furthermore, there is 
little evidence that right-to-work laws have any effect on the level of unionisation or of 
lessening industrial strife. Indeed, in the period 1964-78, there was a 45.6 percent 
increase in union mernbership in those states, as opposed to only a 4 percent increase in 
other states (Hanson et al., 1982, pp.l54-56; Delaney et al., 1985, p.62). Part of this 
disparity can be explai ned by the effect of a lower base in right-to-work states. Finally , 
"strikes arc more likely to occur and arc more severe in states wllh right-to-work statutes 
than elsewhere" (Gramm, 1986, p.373). 
Developing countnes also support union security as a way to improve industrial 
relations by ensuring tndustrial stabihty and soctal development. Many believe that 
unions perform important functions in modem society and deserve special protec tion 
(Cordova and Ozaki, 1980, p.24), a phi losophy akin to that formerly held by New 
Zealand employers, that compulsory uniontsm was in their interests by leading to less 
workforce unrest and militancy (Brosnan, 1983, pp.2-3; Rudman, 1974, pp.61-63; 
Harbridge and Walsh. 1985, p.202; Hanson et al, 1982, p.l3). 
Before leaving this issue, it is Interesting that in a debate which claims to focus on 
worker rights, there has not been greater discussion of actual wot~cr behaviour. Objective 
data arc available. For instance, Howells has compiled staustics of ballots by union 
membership after 1977 on whether to rcLain an unquali tied preference clause. He found no 
grounds well of worker opposition to compulsory unionism (Howells, 1983, pp.1 00-101, 
1 06). The exercise was quite expensive. Balloting alone was estimated at $600,000, plus 
time lost to normal activities. The Department of Labour incurreJ ~500,000 travel 
expenses, plus employee salaries supervising the elections. Lost production time was 
estimated at 14,772 days, exceeding the time los t in the second and third most strike 
prone industries in 2 of 4 years preceding 1976 (Howel ls, 1983, p.l07; Walsh, 1983, 
p.20). 
Harbridge and Walsh have dealt with the period after 1984, as a consequence of the 
Industrial Relations Amendment Act, whtch outlawed con1pulsory uniontsm. They found 
that most unions lost but between 1 and 5 percent of members during that period, wtth 
some of those losses actually attributable to redundancies as opposed to refusals to JOin 
(Harbridge and Walsh, 1985, pp.l99-200) 
Under the Labour Relations Act, workers vote on compulsory unionism if employers 
refuse to agree to a union membership provtsion. As at 18 October 1989, 44 ballots had 
been held, approximately 10 to 20 percen t of those whtch arc likely to be held . All 
supported including union membership provisions (Fuller, 1989, p.l4). Accordtng Lo the 
\ 
2 Compare NLRB. v General Motors Corp, 373 US 734, 742 (1963). 
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Office of the Registrar of Unions, that figure had risen to 70 ballots by February 13, 
1990, all supporting compulsory unionism. 
Whatever interpretation can be made of worker behaviour, it can at least be said that 
workers arc not seizing opportunities to rid themselves of compulsory unionism. The 
interpretation of how the associations managed to miss the mark by so much is less clear. 
2. Voluntary representation 
The associations arc not only concerned about worker lack of freedom as represented 
by compulsory unionism. They arc also distressed that New Zealand workers are denied 
freedom of association by being represented by unions they personally may not have 
selected (NZBR, 1989, p.7; NZBR, 1986, p.48; Fergusson, 1989, p.9). They want a 
procedure that docs away with this. The practical effect of abolishing the current system 
is unclear. Workers have many views and different desires. Full freedom to choose could 
lead to many unions representing an employers' workforce, with greater workplace strife 
and militancy. Competing unions increase demarcation disputes and the need for frequent 
negotiation (Brosnan, 1983, pp.2-3; Edwards, 1986, p.l45) 
This could also conflict with the associations' proposals that each worksite have one 
representative. It cannot be that workers both exercise full freedom of choice and yet arc 
represented only by one enterprise-wide agent. 
Returning to the fundamental question addressed here, is New Zealand unique in not 
permitting workers unfettered freedom to choose? Again, the answer is that New 
Zealand's system has parallels abroad and not only in Australia. Many countries base 
their framework for industrial relations on exclusive bargaining rights for a union 
(Cordova and Ozaki, 1980, p.26). In the United States, section 9(a) of the National Labor 
Relations Act provides: 
Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining 
by Lhe majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall 
be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the 
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of 
employment, or other conditions of cmploymcnL 
A union is given this right if it is chosen by more than 50 percent of the unit. As 
institutions of a democratic country, i l is not surprising that New Zealand unions operate 
by the principle of majority rule. Indeed in the corporate context, shareholders or officers 
representing a minority view would not be permitted to divide the corporate structure. 
They arc expected to pull behind the majority view. 
3. Award coverage 
Next to compulsory unionism, employer organisations arc most opposed to award 
coverage as opposed to enterprise bargaining (NZEF, 1989a; NZEF, 1988a, p.3; NZBR, 
1989, pp.7-9; NZBR, 1987a, pp.S-6), also referred to as deccntraliscd labour relations 
(NZEF, 1988c; NZBR, 1987, p.5; NZB R, 1986, pp.5, 44 ). The Business Roundtable 
claims: "Uniforn1 national agreements arc virtually unknown ouL")ide" Australia and Nc\\ 
Zealand (Trotter, 1986a, p.9). Prior to the enactn1ent of the Labour Relat..ions Act, NC\\ 
Zealand provided for enterprise bargaining through secondary agreements (NZPC, 1986, 
pp.41-43; Harbridge and McCaw, 1989, pp.IS0-152; NZBR, 1987b, p.14). Etnploycr 
organisations contend that the system docs not take into account employer ability to pa) 
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and the possible existence of multiple agrccrncnts or awards applying in one workplace 
(Bradford, 1983; Rose, 1986, p. 73). 
Again, New Zealand is not unique in the existence of bargaining agreements which, 
like awards, extend beyond the single workplace. The level at which bargaining takes 
place in a counlry depends on factors such as national trarutions, the structure of employer 
and employee organisations, the level at which employee solidarity is felt, the size of the 
country, tactical considerations, and cconon1ic conditions (ILO, 1977, p.28). 
The Business Roundtable cites the United States as a successful model of a 
decentraliscd bargaining system (NZBR, 1987a, p.l 0). In the United States, unions arc 
certified as representatives in units based on an en1ploycr's organisation in a craft, plant, 
employer-wide, or subdivision unit. Unions in the United States thus begin their 
representation at precisely the point desired by New Zealand employer organisations. 
This is not where the mallcr ends. Once a union has representation rights, the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is indifferent to the unit in which negotiations 
t.herc.afler take place. Unions and employers can and do voluntarily alter representational 
units and, with them, agreement coverage (Weber, 1967, p.23). 
What do they choose? By 1961, of 150,000 co1lective bargaining agrcerncnts in the 
United States, multi-plant agreements dominated the manufacturing sec tor and multi-
employer agreements the non-manufacturing sector (Weber, 1967, p.25). More recently, 
12 percent of contracts in production units were on a multi-ernployer basis and of 2034 
single employer contracts, 29 were company-wide and based on indusLry-wide pattems,3 
125 were company-wide, and 49 involved multiple unions and were company-wide 
(Hendricks and Kahn, 1982, p.198). In the non-manufacturing sector, the trend to multi-
employer agreements is much sLronger, particularly in Lransportation and construction 
indusLries. In 1980, 33.6 percent of non-manufacturing conLracts were multi-employer 
and 13.9 percent were multi-plant. When manufacturing and non-Inanufacturing arc 
combined, 40.4 percent arc multi-employer (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, p.39; sec also 
Derber, 1984, pp.83-93). 
European counLries such as West Germany, Sweden, and Italy have also rnoved to 
multi-employer bargaining at the national level (Sisson, 1987, pp.13, 31, 90). In Japan , 
multi-employer bargaining exists in industnes such as sh ipping, steel and metal, 
railways, printing and textiles (Sisson, 1987, pp.171-72; Levine, 1984, pp.347-53). In 
Britain, where multi-employer bargaining has declined since the 1960s, the change has 
been accompanied by a large number of sLrikes (Sisson, 1987, pp.18-22). 
In addition, in many United States industries, particularly in those n1ost in1port.ant to 
the economy, pallem and coalition bargaining, national contracts, or r,1aster contracts arc 
the rule. Local supplements, simi lar in some respects to second tier bargaining arc also 
found (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, p.35; Sisson, 1987, pp.l71-72). In British cornpanies 
in the private sector, nearly half bargain at a rnulti-crnploycr level (Booth, 1989, pp.231-
32). 
3 There arc several terms frequently used in the United States to apply to various types of 
collective bargaining agreements. The term "pattern bargaining" as used in the United 
States refers to bargaining in which a contract is negotiated with a leader in an industry. 
with all subsequent contracts with competitors being based on this pattern. This describes 
bargaining in the automotive industry. "Master contracts" are comznon in the trucking 
industry in which all unionised employers in the industry sign an agreement negotiated at 
the national level. Local supplements may also be signed with individual plants to 
embody narrowly res tricted local conditions. "!\1ost favoured nation" agreements arc 
often negotiated requiring a union which reaches more favourable terms with a later 
signing competitor to provide the same terms to earlier signatories. effectively 
maintaining terms of collective bargaining agreements within narrow boundaries. 
166 E.J. Dannin 
It is impossible to grasp the impact of union bargaining if one simply looks at the 
percentage of unorganised versus organised workers as the Business Roundtable docs 
(NZBR, 1987b, p.6). Many non-union American employers, including large ones such 
as IBM, model their wages and benefits on union contracts. 
The reasons for choosing the level of bargaining are complex. Employers with a 
vertical structure comprising several plants may prefer a multi-plant agreement since a 
strike at one plant will mean a s toppage of all production (Weber, 1967, pp.21-22). 
Small employers may prefer multi-employer bargaining to compensate for a power 
deficiency, to lower bargaining costs, or to ensure that competitors have made the same 
deal and will be hit with a strike at the same time, preventing them from increasing their 
market share (Weber, 1967, pp.15-17, 19; Booth, 1989, p.226; Sisson, 1987, pp.6-7; 
NZPC, 1986, p.47; Kahn-Freund, 1977, p.l32; Department of Labour, 1985, p.22). In 
times of technological or economic change, multi-employer bargaining can allow more 
successful resolutions of the ensuing problems (Willman, 1986, p.138). 
Not everyone opts for multi-employer bargaining. Unions may prefer to bargain at 
the lowest level to target one employer, set a pattern agreement while that ctnployer's 
competitors are still in operation, and then whipsaw later employers (Booth, 1989, p.228; 
Weber, 1967, pp.20-21). This occurred with second tier bargaining in New Zealand 
(Pearson and Thoms, 1983, p.22). Such an arrangement also has the advantage to the 
union that not all members need be on strike at the same time. Unions may also prefer 
s ingle employer bargaining as being more responsive to that workplace's needs and th us 
resulting in higher union affiliation among the membership (ILO, 1977, p.30). 
Employers who dominate a particular industry generally prefer single employer 
bargaining, feeling they can negotiate the agreement best for them, including one that 
involves a higher settlement than their competitors can manage in the hope that they will 
be forced to follow the pattern and then be put out of business (Booth, 1989, p.227; bu t 
cf. , NZBR, 1989, pp .ll -12). Some have suggested that enterprise or decentralised 
bargaining results in a higher level of disarray in the workplace and increased work 
stoppages (Barkin , 198 1, p.l 3; Hince, 1986, p.l 7). 
It is curious that employer organisations have taken such a strong stand on this issue, 
since thei r membership includes employers of all sizes, in all sorts of industries, with a 
multipl ic ity of needs. This was noted by the Department of Labour at the time 
submissions were made on the Labour Relations Act 1987 (Department of Labour, 1986, 
p.v). 
In any case, the Labour Relations Act allows an employer to negotiate at the 
enterprise level by inducing the union to do so, although the New Zealand Business 
Roundtable doubts their abil ity to do this (NZBR, 1987 , p. l 5). They can bargain less 
frequently by seeking agreements or awards for longer terms. These would have the 
advantage of making condi tions more certa in for a longer period but the disadvan tage of 
providing less flex ibility to meet changing conditions. 
Nothing in the current legislation prohibits employers from offering combinations of 
inducements and persuasion to achieve the form of bargaining they desire. To the extent 
they have not been successful , is not because of the Labour Relations Act but because 
others have not been persuaded. 
4. Single union bargaining 
Employer associations have advoca ted having all employees of one en1ploycr 
represen ted by a single union (NZBR, 1987a, p.5; NZBR, 1986, p.45~ NZEF, 1987, 
pp.4-5). Currently, a New Zealand employer may have to deal with rnore than one union 
in the workplace. Ag3in, New Zealand is not alone in this. In the United States, for 
example, it is not unusual for an employer to bargain with more than one un1on. 
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Hospitals present the most telling example. Congress mandated that there be no 
proliferation of bargaining units within health care institutions. After years of court 
battles and agency hearings, rules were promulgated finding 8 units to be presumed 
appropriate in the hospital context.4 No other indusLry has a requirement of non-
proliferation. 
Multiple bargaining units and agents do not favour one side or the other. It has been 
the experience of the NLRB that employees arc best represented within a unit of 
employees performing like work under similar conditions as opposed to being 
amalgamated in group with diverse interests, represented by a labour organisation not 
familiar with their terms and conditions of employment. Having more than one unit of 
representation may have an advantage to an employer of being able to continue operations 
in the event of a strike. 
The infatuation of the associations with enterprise unions might best be explained by 
the following passage from one of their submissions: 
Why do Japanese unions allow a degree of flexibility that would be an anathen1a 
to American unions? The reason: they arc organised company-wide rather than 
industry-wide. Because national unions in Japan rarely control locals' policies, 
a single industry contains several different 'enterprise unions' as lhey are called, 
and these unions compete with one another. Workers will moderate wage 
demands rather than jeopardise their firm's market share (NZBR, 1987b, pp.9-
1 0). 
5. Labour courts 
Employer associations regularly argue for the abolition of the Labour Court's 
jurisdiction. They prefer that their jurisdiction be placed in the regular civil courts 
(NZBR, 1986, pp.iii, iv, 5-6, 11, 32, 40, 4 7). 
The Labour Court has virtually exclusive jurisdiction over industrial di~putes (Labour 
Relations Act, sections 278-308). While the Court normally consists of a judge alone, it 
has a tripartite structure of a legally trained judge assi~ted by two panel members 
nominated by organisations of employers and unions to deal with personal gnevances and 
demarcation disputes (Labour Relations Act s.286; sec also Department of Labour, 1986, 
pp.l8-19; Vranken and Hince, 1988). Such a structure is con11non to E uropcan countries 
and the rest of the world (Aaron, 1985, pp.36-37; Vranken and Hince, 1988, pp.121-22). 
The United States, differs in not having such a structure in its government labour courts 
but does retain it in certain arbitration situations. 
The United States does maintain government agencies, including one of cabinet level, 
to investigate, prosecute, and decide violations of labour law: primarily the NLRB and the 
Department of Labor. The NLRB performs certain adjudicatory functions sin1ilar to the 
Labour Court but, in addition, prosecutes defined violations, such as illegally 
discriminatory acts and bargaining in bad faith. Furthermore, in its 50 years of existence 
it has developed a body of law specific to the regulatory needs of the workplace. These 
reflect an understanding that industrial law must develop without importing inappropriate 
common law concepts: 
4 Sec St. Francis Hospital, 271 NLRB No.l60 (1984) and its progeny and resulting 
regulations, which find 8 units (doctors, nurses, other professionals, tcchnicals, skilled 
maintenance, business office clericals, guards, and other non-professionals) to be 
presumptively appropriate in the hospital setting, setting the matter at rest. Sec Monthly 
labor review. 112(8): 52. 
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Industrial law, or labour law, is clearly distinct from other related areas of study 
such as commercial or company law because of its social dimension. It is 
concerned with labour or work which is done in a position of (legal) 
subordination ... lL is only because the principles of freedom to contract arc of 
little usc in what is essentially a relationship of economic dependence between 
"master" and "servant" that workers become organised ... It must be borne in 
mind. though, that an acknowledgement of the weak bargaining position of the 
individual worker is what industrial law is all about (Vranken, 1986, p.5). 
Industrial law developed because the common law wa~ inadequate to deal satisfactorily 
with common events in the workplace, such as discharge or dissatisfaction with wages or 
other working conditions (Wilson, 1979, p.1; Atlcson, 1983, pp.l3-14, 94 ). Dependence 
upon common law contract concepts, for example, necessitates fitting the industrial 
reality to a Procrustean bed based on mutuality and freedom of contract, all the while 
requiring that one party to the relationship remain subservient to the daily and even 
changing demands of the other (S mith, 1975, pp.341-343, 365). 
To create law specifically applicable to the industrial context and then leave its 
interpretation and application in the hands of civil judges imbued with the common law 
will inevitably lead to an admixture of concepts which the law was enacted to be rid of 
(Wedderburn, 1987, pp.13-17; Kahn-Freund, 1977. pp.l2-14, 162). The Labour Court 
judges have articulated the need to ensure that New Zealand's industrial law is applied in a 
manner consistent with reality and the purpose of the legislation. At his swearing in, 
Judge Goddard stated: 
I am conscious of the task that confronts me. The Labour Court plays a unique 
role in promoting and advancing harmony in the workplace. Harmony leads to 
productivity and productivity leads to more jobs, but it docs more than that. It 
also conduces to that caring, tolerant and just society for which we all 
long .... This Coun uses special techniques of dispute resolution. Most of its 
cases arc decided not according to rigid or inflexible absolute rules of law but 
according to equity and good conscience . What this means is not generally 
understood. Equity is fair pl~y in action. Equity and good conscience involves 
an ethical approach to lhc Coun's work on a case by case basis. It involves the 
Coun in a persuasive as much as a coercive role and in a protective one in 
suggesting improved standards of conduct in the workplace. leading to that high 
level of mutual trust and confidence between employers and workers and between 
workers and their fellows necessary for the effective functioning of industry 
(Anon., 1989, p.JO). 
The common law system has been largely irrelevant to New Zealand collective labour 
law since 1894, when New Zealand opted for a statutory system (Anderson, 1987, pp.91 -
92). The common law S) stem based itself on the primacy of private property and 
employer prerogative (\Vedderbum, 1987. pp.l3-14 ). Atlcson observes that the common 
law courts have essentially implied into the fonnation of the employment contract a 
presumption that the employer has the right to seck to create the largest possible gap 
between the yield of its asscL<; (i.e. workers) and the cost of hire. (Atleson, 1983, p.l4.). 
A return to the common law could be at the expense of developing a body of law relevant 
to tndustriallifc. 
6. Continued representation 
Employer associations also arc am hi tious to c urtai I the con tin ucd rcpn).SCnt~tional 
sta tus of un1ons. One \\ay they propose to do this is by permitting employers to oflcr 
individual contract~ to workers, in essence, bidding against their union (NZEF, 1987, p.3; 
NZB R, 1986, pp.iv, 6-7, 4 7). The B usincss Roundtable claims that such "development 
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of non-unioniscd arrangements" is permiLtcd elsewhere, but without specifying where 
(NZBR, 1986, p.49). 
Such a system could create chaos in the workplace, undercutting attempts to resolve 
workplace problems. At the time of expiration there could be weeks and months of 
uncertainty as an employer waged negotiations on several fronts. Bitterness and 
uncertainty, the seeds of indusLrial unrest, would find fertile ground. 
Putting aside questions of the wisdom of fomenting chaos in the workplace, is such a 
practice permitted in the United States? The answer is that such an action in the United 
States would violate at least 3 sections of the NLRA. United States employers arc 
prohibited from dealing directly with employees or offering to those who cross the picket 
line higher wages than have been offered across the bargaining table.5 Such an offer is 
evidence per se of bargaining in bad faith, a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 
The failure to have such a requiren1ent may be the weakest link in the New Zealand 
system of labour law at presenl. It permits and even encourages the employer to draw out 
negotiations hoping the union will be pressured to settle cheaply as its award nears its 
death, thereby essentially rewarding those who do not live up to their social obligation to 
engage in collective negotiations.Depending on the scale of the violation, section 8(a)(2) 
of the NLRA would also likely be violated, and either scheme would violate section 
8(a)(l ). 
The next time the associations venture into this sort of claim as to other countries' 
systems, it might want LO add Lhe congressional hearings for Lhe Wagner Act. The 2 large 
volumes arc replete with speeches Inveighing against precisely thi~ sort of behaviour. 
7. The question of the commonality of employer and worker 
interests 
The associations arc particularly up in anns over suggestions that the interests of 
employers and workers arc not one. With righteous indignation, they condemn those 
benighted souls who seck to put asunder those whom the individual employment contract 
has joined together. The associations blame adversarial relations on union officials who 
foster hostiJity for their own self interest: 
The current system ... fosters conflict - the myth of an enduring struggle between 
capital and labour - where the reality is that employers and workers have a 
shared interest in serving consumers, an interest that can only b0 fostered by 
cooperation. It protects the narrow interest of the officials of established 
unions at the expense of workers ... (lv1yers, 1989, p.3). 
In the battle against advcrsarial relations, the associations' leitmotif is heard once 
more: countries such as the United States have abandoned such philosophies (NZBR, 
1989, p.14; NZBR, 1987a, p.5; NZBR, undated, p.2; Hutton, 1987, p.4; Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984, pp.221-39; sec also NZBR, 1987b, pp.ii, 4, 6; NZBR, 1986, p.15). The 
short answer is that there ha~ been no such legislative change in the United S rates. Some 
employers and unions have entered into cooperation agreements, just as those in New 
Zealand can and do under Lhe reviled Labour Relations Acl. 
This raises an important issue which is implicit in the vision promulgated by the 
associations. The fundamental statements of the associations which propose a totalitarian 
view of labour relations, question the value of democratic institutions. It is quite clear 
that the associations think that it is the role of management to manage, and of labour, 
recognising the wisdom of management, to acquiesce supin~y. Early industrialists 
5 See e.g., Medo Corp v NLRB. 321 US 678 (1944); 1.1. Case Co v NLRB, 321 US 322 
( 1944 ). 
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operated this way (D ecks, 1976, p.27; Atleson , 1983, pp.44-45). Atlcson concludes that 
the fact so many Americans historically were either bound workers, apprentices, or slaves, 
not free to leave or change their circumsL.anccs, has continued to affect the view most 
Americans hold of the employment relationship and the roles of employer and employee 
(Atleson, 1983, p.88). and a recent study suggests that these tendencies still exist among 
N ew Zealand employers (M cAndrew, 1989, pp.142-43). The associations' statements 
lend further support lO that conclusion . 
Democracy requires diversity and robust discussion. Blind obedience is not the lot of 
citizens. How the interests of democracy and those of the corporation arc best served is a 
matter that is at least still open to discussion . This warrants caution and the maintenance 
of a responsive system, not the straitjacket that has been proposed. The Labour Relations 
A ct already permits setting up the cooperati ve programmes the associations espouse i f 
they can make a persuasive case to the unions. If unions arc not persuaded, the legi slative 
system has not failed. lL simply means that the case has not yet been made. Employers 
arc free to marshall their argumcnL~ and try again. 
The assoc iations may be convtnccd that differences between employees and ~mploycrs 
no longer cx tst. However, there arc people who sincerely believe that important divisions 
rcma1n and that not until these differences have been composed can it be said there IS no 
need for a legislative system that recognises them. 
T hose who believe that di f ferences still ex ist can point to a number of fac tors as 
evidence. Employers, for example, want to keep wages low to increase shareholder 
profits and provide for tnvcstmcnt. W orkers want real wages set at a living rate or higher. 
W orkers owe respect and deference to their employers both in speech and non-verbal 
behaviour, but the reverse is not true. Employers want a qualified worker for each job. 
W orkers want to ensure there tS a JOb for each worker. Employers want flexibility to 
shed excess labour when needed, and as expeditiousl y as possible, through changes m 
hours worked, sovereign deciston-making as to deployment of workers and j ob conten t, 
and subcontracting. W orkers wan t j ob security. Employers are supposed to be sober and 
responsible in thei r conduct, while employees arc assumed to need external control s placed 
on thetr behaviour. Employers have control of the workplace and the sole ri ght to 
regulate worker effort, while employees arc controlled and constrained not to regulate their 
level of effort. Employers sec work as outputs of production at a certain l evel of quality. 
W orkers define work as inputs of effort, time and thought. Finally, and most telling, the 
evidence is that the employers like their j obs, whereas most workers do not, nor do they 
f ind them chal l engmg or fu I fd ling (Atktnson, 1987, pp.89-9 1; Atleson, 1983, pp. 7 -9; 
NZPC, 1986, pp.S, 21; K ahn-Freund, 1977, p.48 ; Macarov , 1982, pp.14, 95-96, 100-
10 1). 
It is these di fferences w hich cause workers to feel a need for effec tive unions to 
present thetr dtstinct vtcws to management (M cDonald, 1974, pp.22 1, 227). While there 
need not be all -out war as a result of the dt f fcrcnt interes ts o f workers and employers, 
failure lO recognise thetr ex istence and importance is a failure to deal with reality. 
Chief executives prefer to explain industrial conflict a<; poor communication (Edwards, 
1986, p.20), conccntratmg on con ntct in terms of work stoppages alone (Brooks, 1974, 
p.205). Employer associations have turned to employee invol vement schemes to increase 
producl1v1ty and to decrease strike ac tivity. However, when these programmes have been 
used as a technique to increase production and not to incorporate true participation (Smi th, 
1978, pp.7 1, 79), they often dec line (Elligcr and N issen, 1987, pp.20 1-02). 
T he problem is that an employer cannot express respect for his or her workers, yet 
c latm thc tr v iews, parllcular ly m choosing unton representation , arc not l egitimate 
(Smith, 1978, p.74; M cDonald , 1974 , p.227). StiO~ng union input as a conduit for 
worker v iews may have disastrous effects. T hese include absenteeism, labour turnover, 
tardiness, acc idcnt'i, poor performance, h1gh wastage, lack of care o f equipment, 
demorall c;auon, workmg to rule, and even sabotage. Thts lo t productivity can be more 
costl y than strikes, although more difficult to measure (Brooks, 1974, p.205~ Brown, 
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1977, pp.380-81; Edwards, 1986, pp.lO, 37, 50, 73, 249, 256; Willman, 1986, p.202; 
Decks, 1976, p.31; Howells, 1974, p.175; Schmidt, 1972, pp.26-28; Atlcson, 1983, 
pp.36-39; Wilson, 1979, pp.3-4 ). 6 Grievance systems set up without union involvement 
have been found insufficient to replace those provided by unions, because employees fear 
reprisals or feel they are ineffective since a high percentage of decisions uphold 
management's original decision (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, pp.1 08-09). 
The most strongly expressed complaint by the associations is that unions block 
change. It has been found that unions do not block legitimate change when they arc 
provided information , equity and access to decision-making but do when the employment 
relationship is characterised by suspicion (Willman, 1986, pp.106-07; sec also Freeman 
and Medoff, 1984, pp.174-75). It is easy to be frustrated if a union docs not feel the same 
enthusiasm for a change management might like to make (Department of Labour, 1986, 
pp.1-2) or to be frustrated at not being able to take unilateral action (Freeman and Medoff, 
1984, p.73). However, studies have concluded that management is more often 
responsible for inefficient labour utilisation. A 1976 British survey of the causes of 
inefficient labour use found that of the 26 studies surveyed, 21 identified management 
failures as a cause, and 10 identified them as the key cause. 9 identified unsatisfactory 
employer-union negotiating procedures as a cause. In contrast, 14 identified union 
restrictive practices and none found it to be a key cause. Willman also concluded that 
Brit.ish managers created unnecessary anxiety among workers facing technological change 
and displacement, which in tum led to less efficient and satisfactory resolutions 
(Willman, 1986, p.SS-59). In addillon unilateral action is unwise since it increases 
resistance by leaving unions unable to respond on any other level than protecting job 
security and worker earnings (Willman, 1986, p.166). 
Some countries have found that unions contribute to business success. In the Uni ted 
States, the effectiveness of employee involvement programmes tn improving quality and 
productivity, as judged by management, is increased by the percentage of the workforce 
which is unioniscd (Cooke, 1989, p.313) Recent studies in the Un1tcd States have found 
that a unioniscd workforce increases productivity by 1 to 2 percenL This is attributed to a 
lower quit rate caused by the grievance system and features such as scnioray which 
increase employees' security and feeling of having a voice (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, 
pp.95-1 09; Freeman, 1980, pp.30, 31 ), and also to a change in management atlltudcs 
resulting in greater cooperat.ion in matters such as introducing r.ew technology (Freeman 
and Medoff, 1984, pp.174-75). Such an effect was anucipated by the 1894 Industrial 
Conciliation &Arbitration Act (Pearson and Thorns, 1983, pp.138-39). This level of 
improved productivity is, however highly scnsJtlve to the state of labour-management 
relat.ions (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, p.176). 
In addition to improving worker attitudes, collective bargaining causes management to 
think through contemplated changes, and to explore alternatives 1n order to present a clear 
case for the union. In some cases, management may not know the best way to achieve 
efficiency and, even if it did could not always achieve its goals (Edwards, 1986, pp.220-
21; Willman, 1986, p.45)7. Added deliberation may save management from dashing to 
6 One worker, reflecting on his frustration in working a low paid, wet, difficult job without 
readily available protective equipment stated: "In fact, most people here llke 1t best when 
things don't work right and production goes to hell, and I'm right along with them. And 
that's a crummy way to waste your working time"(fumer, 1987, pp.7 -8). 
7 In one case studied a chief executive officer sabotaged hi~ employee involvement 
programme by his unwillingness to change the corporat'C culture of a unilateral 
management (Chelte et al., 1989, p.l53). The nature of the opposition to unions in New 
Zealand takes on a different character and is acted upon in different ways than is the case m 
the United States. In the United States, the battle lines arc drawn outside the legislative 
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implement every newly attractive trend. They may gain a more sophisticated 
understanding of the ramifications of the contemplated change. A study of negotiators' 
attitudes found that after negotiating, the bargainers' appreciation for the validity of the 
goals of the other side increased (Smith and Turkington, 1981, p.11). 
8. Conclusions 
This analysis is a curious exercise. Anyone who has reached this point should be 
well aware that basic arguments of the New Zealand Business Roundtable and Employers 
Federation arc objec tively untrue. By this I mean that the incorrect assertions made by 
them cannot be explained by dtfferences in ideology or viewpoint. They ignore well 
known laws which they could read by opening the appropriate statute book. They ignore 
• 
clauses found nearly universally in collective bargaining agreements. They ignore 
phenomena of industrial relation~ systems commonly discussed and found in books and 
journal~ in New Zealand. Finally, they ignore the impact of worldwide economic 
problems, New Zealand\ spectal problems of s11.e and location , and New Zealand's 
relatively good performance compared with other countries of its Size (Rose, 1986, p.67) 
and prefer arguments which, even 1f true, arc at best a poor means of explaining New 
Zealand's economic problems. 
Thctr underlying argument is that unions arc Illegitimate. They claim this in part 
because they owe thctr existence tn New Zealand to statute (NZBR, 1986, p.7; sec also 
Wedderburn, 1984, pp. 78-79). If owing ones' existence to statute made one illegitimate, 
then what would be the fate of many members of employer organisations? After all, 
corporauons arc not found in nature. They were created by legislative action and would 
otherwt~c not be legal. A corporation is nothmg but an aggregation of capital given the 
legal sta tus of a person and perm ittcd to do busmcss while not making those who benefit 
responsible for its acuons (Anderson, 1987, p.94-95; Wedderburn, 1987, p.21; Ireland, et 
al., 1987, p.149-50, 153). 
Indeed, but for the protections in law provided to corporations, unions might be 
unncccs~ry (Vranken, 1986, p.7). Unions carne inlo existence to perrnit workers to deal 
effectively with the aggregations of capital penniued by the corporate fonn (Bark1n, 1981 , 
pp.2-3). Were corporc..Lions to be weighed in the same scale advocated for unions, the 
current news of emplo;er fraud and mismanagement wh1ch has wrought economic havoc 
and Lami~hed New Zealand\ repuu.lljon, mtght well support a call for an end to the special 
privileges the corporate form provides. The point, however, ts not to ftx blame but to 
gain the sophisticated perspective necessary to make wise decisions. 
Perhaps what the employer a~~octauons arc trying to say Is that the balance of power 
has tilted too strongly towards labour. That Is a fair matter for debate and discussion. So 
far, available objective dat.a do not )upport that conclusion. For example, a study of the 
1987/1988 wage round led to the concl usion that en1ployers had experienced greater power 
1n it and were able to achieve outcomes favourable to them in term~ of work rules and 
arena. Freeman and Medoff 'Hale t.hat dcsptte pub!tc awareness of criminality within union 
ranks, the rate of corporule criminal V10lat10n.s far exceeds that of unions. They speculate 
that tht.s 1s caused by the access to large amounts of money by companies and their greater 
potential t.o engage in criminal act.s (Freeman and Medoff. 1984. pp.214-15). The 
qualification is necessary since in instances in which labour-management relations 
deteriorate, producltVtty suffers They concluded that in the United States unions have no 
effect on the proft ts of competttt ve firms. They do lower the profit margins of scmi -
monopoll.sttc firms to normal competitive levels (Freeman and Medoff. 1984, pp.l82-
82) In lhis way, unions serve as a substitulc for anti-trust measures, pcrmiuing the public 
to share in those profits (Ulman, 1967, p.l). 
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other aspects of awards without having to concede any extra wages (Harbridge and 
McCaw, 1989, p.161~ Harbridge and Drcaver, 1989, p.253-55). 
Caution must be exercised in pcrmiuing further aggrandisement of power. It goes 
without saying that if every employer is able to pay its employees as little as possible, 
soon there will be no workers able to purchase what is produced. (Brosnan and Wilkinson, 
1989, p.52; Abbott, 1989, p.284). Of greater long term danger is economic research that 
indicates companies paying lower wages have less incentive to become more productive 
(Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1989, p.l6; Willman, 1986, p.45). In the United States, those 
companies that arc unionised and with higher wages can also be the most productive 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984, pp.167-70). It may also be that increased worker 
productivity is most effectively achieved through higher pay rather than tinkering with 
legislative systems (Macarov, 1982, pp.l67-68). 
Before considering further changes we must ask, first, whether the fundamental 
changes advocated may be inimical to a society which has evolved in response to a certain 
legislative scheme and, second, whether it is wise to tilt the balance of industrial relations 
even further towards employers. In short, New Zealand will be best served by a labour 
relations policy that embodies democratic values of justice and tolerance and that is ca~t in 
the mould of its unique qualities and national vision. 
What is unacceptable, however, is that a po-werful segment of a soctety abdicate its 
responsibility to the public by pursuing a course to achieve its own ends. Perhaps in the 
age in which we live, a call for responsibility IS so idealistic that the reader will be forced 
to blush that anyone could be so ingenuous. Risking that, I think it is patently obvious 
that we need a functioning democracy in order to retain a vibrant, diverse community. 
Those unwilling to join honestly and serious!) In discourse on those terms ultimately do 
a grave disservice to the sptrit of democracy and candid purposeful debate. Without a 
doubt, the people of New Zealand expect and ceruunly deserve better. 
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